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Abstract 
New forms of production based in electronic technology, such as open-source and open-
content production, convert private commodities (typically software) into essentially 
public goods. A number of studies find that, like in other collective goods, incentives for 
reputation and group identity motivate contributions to open source goods, thereby 
overcoming the social dilemma inherent in producing such goods.  In this paper we 
examine how contributor motivations affect the quality of contributions to the open-
content online encyclopedia Wikipedia.  We find that quality is associated with 
contributor motivations, but in a surprisingly inconsistent way. Registered users’ quality 
increases with more contributions, consistent with the idea of participants motivated by 
reputation and commitment to the Wikipedia community.  Surprisingly, however, we find 
the highest quality from the vast numbers of anonymous “Good Samaritans” who 
contribute only once. Our findings that Good Samaritans as well as committed “zealots” 
contribute high quality content to Wikipedia suggest that it is the quantity as well as the 
quality of contributors that positively affects the quality of open source production.   
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The Quality of Open Source Production:  
Zealots and Good Samaritans in the Case of Wikipedia 
I. Introduction 
When we think about the revolution in information and communication 
technologies over the past decade we might fail to recognize some of the amazing 
organizational innovations that have also emerged (cf. Neff and Stark 2003; O’Mahony 
2003).  One of the most important of these organizational innovations is the emergence of 
“open source” production (also known as “open content”), defined as the free and open 
creation, alteration and distribution of goods, typically software, via the contributions 
from vast numbers of widely distributed and uncoordinated actors (Lakhani and Wolf 
2005; Open Source Initiative 2005).  Open source production is remarkable because it 
converts a private commodity (typically software) into essentially a public good (Kollock 
1999; Kogut and Metiu 2001; O’Mahony 2003).
1  Indeed, advocates of open source 
software often describe it as a “movement,” similar to social movements for other public 
goods (Raymond 2001; Stallman 1999; Torvalds and Diamond 2001).   
  Early studies of open source suggest that production is fueled by a small number 
of experts who contribute much of the content (Ghosh and Prakash 2000; Mockus et al 
2005; Lerner and Tirole 2002; Lakhani and von Hippel 2002).  According to this 
research, these experts are motivated by factors such as reputation and group identity, 
mechanisms identified by social scientists as capable of overcoming the social dilemma 
inherent in collective goods production.  Here we move beyond examinations of what 
motivates contributors to ask, how are contributor motivations related to the quality of 
open source goods?    
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  In general public goods are chronically under produced in society (Olson 1965).  
Given the inherent social dilemma in producing public goods (Olson 1965; Hardin 1968; 
Kollock 1998), open source production would seem to be based on a problematic and 
inefficient model.  Some argue, however, that open source production can be not only 
efficient (Kogut and Metiu 2001), but even superior (e.g., von Hippel 2001; Weber 2005) 
to other forms of production.  Indeed the success of open source software implies that 
open source production may be of superior quality to privately produced software (e.g., 
Mockus et al 2005; cf. Neumann 2005).  Do the collective action mechanisms that 
motivate contributions to open source goods also explain the quality of those goods?  In 
seeking to answer this question, this paper makes three contributions.  First, we theorize 
the relation between contributor motivations in open source goods and quality using the 
case of the online, open-content encyclopedia, Wikipedia.org.  Second, we use data from 
7,058 contributors to Wikipedia.org to test hypotheses about contributor motivations and 
quality.  Finally, we consider the implications for organizing collective action given our 
findings that suggest that it is both the quantity and quality of contributors that positively 
affects the quality of open source production goods.   
 
II. The Case of Wikipedia 
Wikipedia, the online, open content encyclopedia (www.wikipedia.org) is a 
compelling example of open source production. According to its Main Page, Wikipedia is 
“the free-content encyclopedia that anyone can edit.”  The English language version, 
started in 2001, currently has the most content with over 1.75 million articles (as of April 
2007).  Wikipedia describes itself as “a multilingual, web-based, free content  
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encyclopedia project. Wikipedia is written collaboratively by volunteers; its articles can 
be edited by anyone with access to the Internet” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia).   
It has editions in roughly 200 different languages and contains entries both on traditional 
encyclopedic topics and on almanac, gazetteer, and current events topics.  
Not only is Wikipedia content open access, but the creation and revision of the 
content is also entirely open such that anyone can add to or edit any entry.  The precursor 
to Wikipedia was conceived by developers Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger as a freely 
accessible encyclopedia, but the quality was to be ensured by seeking expert 
contributions evaluated by peer review (see Lih 2004; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia#History).  In contrast, Wikipedia as it now exists 
succeeded by replacing professional contributions and expert peer review with their most 
democratic extremes: no proof of identity or qualifications is necessary in order to 
contribute or edit content.   
As with any encyclopedia, the value of Wikipedia is the quality of its content, yet 
its overall quality is a much debated issue.  In the few systematic studies comparing 
quality of content between Wikipedia and professionally produced encyclopedias, 
Wikipedia is found to be comparable in quality (Giles 2005; Lih 2004; cf. Encyclopedia 
Britannica 2006).  Yet questions about quality persist.  The concerns about quality in 
Wikipedia, in both popular press and scholarly accounts, focus on the nature and skills of 
the contributors and editors (Giles 2005; Encyclopedia Britannica 2006; Nature 2006; 
Orlowski 2005; Terdiman 2005; Wagstaff 2004).  Given that the creation of its content is 
completely open, quality depends entirely on who contributes to Wikipedia.  Yet, as noted 
by critics, why would any actor, let alone an expert, contribute?    
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One simple factor encouraging contributions to Wikipedia and other open source 
goods is the low cost of contributing (Lerner and Tirole 2002).  The very ‘wiki’ 
technology used by Wikipedia reduces the costs of participation.  A ‘wiki’ is an online 
document in which every edit made to it is saved as a unique document.  Wikipedia is a 
collection of wiki-pages on specific topics for which the entire edit history of the topic is 
available.  This means that any user can view past edits, add his or her own content, and 
even restore a previous version of the content.  The formal policies of Wikipedia, as well 
as the wiki technology, help to limit (though not prevent) negative contributions, such as 
nonsense contributions or so-called graffiti attacks.  For example, Ciffolilli (2003) argues 
that because Wikipedia is a wiki that saves all past versions of every article, it is very 
easy for friendly contributors to ‘clean up’ a damaged article.  Research by IBM similarly 
shows that graffiti and damage to controversial topic pages are repaired quickly at 
Wikipedia (Wattenberg and Viegas 2003). 
Beyond the cost factor, a plausible reason for the apparent high quality of 
Wikipedia is that contributors can benefit from participating, such as by building a 
reputation within the community.  Reputation systems are powerful mechanisms for 
overcoming collective action problems (Cheshire and Cook 2004; Kollock 1998; Raub 
and Weesie 1990).  Indeed, reputation systems are the basis for success of other new 
Internet-based institutions, such as the auction website eBay (Kollock 1999).  Some 
researchers argue that reputation systems could be the basis for all secure Internet-based 
communication and exchange (e.g., Camp et al 2002; Cheshire and Cook 2004).  In 
studies of various open source projects, one of the primary reasons cited for making 
contributions is the individual incentives of skill-development and building a reputation  
  5 
(Kollock 1999; Lakhani and von Hippel 2003; Lakhani and Wolf 2005; Lerner and Tirole 
2002; von Krogh et al 2003).  Reputation mechanisms motivate participation in open 
source goods because they provide the basis for status in the community (Stewart 2005). 
Wikipedia recognizes the power of reputation and encourages contributors to 
become ‘registered users’ by outlining the benefits of having an account 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Why_create_an_account, April 2007).  
According to Wikipedia, there are now over 4 million registered user accounts, “plus an 
unknown, but quite large, number of unregistered contributors” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedians April 2007).   
Though registered-user names are still merely ‘cheap’ pseudonyms (Friedman and 
Resnick 1999) that are easily abandoned and not necessarily tied to an individual’s real 
identity, they provide a mechanism for establishing and tracking reputation.  For any 
given subject in Wikipedia, users can view the history of contributions.  A user can see 
edits that were contributed by registered Wikipedians (see below), while anonymous 
contributors have no name but merely have an IP address listed.  An IP or Internet-
Protocol address is a 32-digit number used to identify a computer or device on computer 
networks connected to the Internet.  Clicking on a registered user name takes one to the 
“user’s page,” Wikipedia-space where registered users create personalized pages about 
themselves and their contributions to Wikipedia, if they choose to do so.  Wikipedia even 
lists the top 1,000 contributors with the most edits, some of whom have been identified 
by name in the popular press (e.g., Terdiman 2005). Contributors with no interest in 
reputation can remain anonymous.  Though anonymous users are listed by IP address 
only, it is possible to view the history of an IP address similar to a registered user, if more  
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than one contribution is made.  As shown below, however, the majority of anonymous 
users have only one contribution. 
In addition to reputation, some contributors are motivated by an apparent strong 
commitment to the community of “Wikipedians” (Giles 2005; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia_community, accessed 4/2/2007).  The salience of 
a group identity can increase contributions to collective goods (Dawes 1980; Kramer and 
Brewer 1984; Dawes, van de Kragt and Orbell 1990; Turner and Tajfal 1986), including 
open-source projects (Raymond 1999) and virtual communities (Wellman and Gulia 
1999), even though such groups often exist only in virtual ‘online’ space.  Such 
contributors may even be “zealots”, Coleman’s (1990) term for true believers in a 
collective good who contribute for purely intrinsic value beyond rational expectations 
(see, e.g., Lakhani and Wolf 2005; Raymond 1999). 
Wikipedia clearly presents itself as a community: “Wikipedians are the people 
who write and edit articles for Wikipedia…Wikipedian [] suggests someone who is part 
of a group or community. So in this sense, Wikipedians are people who form the 
Wikipedia Community” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedians accessed 
April 2007).  One of the top links on the main webpage is for the “Community Portal” 
which contains information about many different ways that users can participate in the 
community of Wikipedia.   
According to this discussion, contributors to Wikipedia are motivated by two 
factors: (1) reputation and/or (2) commitment to the group identity of the Wikipedia 
community.  How might these motivations influence the quality of contributions? 
Certainly motivations influence participation in Wikipedia.  Contributors interested in  
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building a reputation will register since this is the only way to establish a reputation, 
while contributors with no interest in reputation will remain anonymous.  Identity with 
the community, in contrast, has implications for the level of participation.  Users who 
identify as Wikipedians participate in the community by making many contributions, 
while contributors who do not identify with the community will likely have few 
contributions.   
It is straightforward to consider the quality implications for contributors at the 
intersection of strong interest in reputation and a strong Wikipedia identity, i.e., registered 
users with many contributions.  They are the committed-expert contributors and zealots 
expected by advocates of open-source, and so are expected to have high quality 
contributions. The ability to identify and track the contributions of registered users, 
particularly over many contributions, also suggests such users interested in gaining a 
positive reputation will make many contributions.  Moreover, we can also expect that 
registered users’ with the most contributions will have the highest quality, else they 
would not be able to gain a positive reputation.  This discussion suggests the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Registered users will have more contributions than non-registered 
users.  
Hypothesis 1b: Quality will be highest among registered users with many 
contributions, and  
Hypothesis 1c: Quality will increase with participation (number of contributions) 
for registered users. 
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What are the implications for quality for anonymous contributors?  Virtually all 
theories of social dilemmas would predict low quality from anonymous contributors, 
especially those with low levels of participation, since they would seem to have little 
motivation or incentives to contribute at all.  Yet the lore of open-source suggests that 
anonymous one-time contributors are as important as the zealots.  Who are these Good 
Samaritan contributors?  They are likely to be of two types. The first type of Good 
Samaritans may be, like the zealots, experts in a particular field.  These experts do not 
care about their reputation in Wikipedia (no registration), nor are they committed to 
Wikipedia as a community (few contributions).  Instead they care about their area of 
expertise and so contribute to that topic only.  Taking the time to register would increase 
the costs of contributing for these Good Samaritans, and since they are not interested in 
reputation and do not identify with the community itself, they have no reason to incur 
these costs.  Given their expertise in the subject matter, however, their contributions will 
be of high quality.   
The second type of Good Samaritan is simply the user who sees a mistake or a 
hole and makes a contribution to address it.  These contributions are likely to be shorter 
and less substantive than others and so will be less likely to be edited or changed in the 
future.   
In contrast to registered users whose quality is highest at high levels of 
participation, in both cases of the Good Samaritans, we expect that it is anonymous users 
with the fewest contributions that will have the highest quality.     
But what are the quality implications for anonymous users with high levels of 
participation?  As noted above, high participation levels suggest that the contributor  
  9 
strongly identifies with the Wikipedia community.  Why would a Wikipedian who 
strongly identifies with the community by participating at a high level choose to remain 
anonymous?  One possibility might be that the multiple contributions from a single IP- 
address are not from the same contributor at all, but rather the result of proxies or 
dynamic IP-address allocation in some large companies and universities.  Though 
plausible, it is unlikely that dynamic IP-addresses account for many contributors, in part 
because Wikipedia frequently blocks such networks and proxy servers.  
Another possibility for why some anonymous users might have many 
contributions is that such users know their contributions are of low quality and do not 
want to be identified through a registered user name.  Alternatively, many contributions 
may mean that these users are strongly committed to the Wikipedia community, but 
unlike the registered Wikipedians described above, their interest may be negative rather 
than positive.  These would-be “hackers” may actively seek to contribute low-quality 
content to harm the community.  
The motivations of anonymous contributors, including both Good Samaritans and 
high participation-anonymous contributors, leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Anonymous users will have shorter contributions than registered 
users. 
Hypothesis 2b: Anonymous users with few contributions will have high quality 
content, and 
Hypothesis 2c: Quality of contributions will decrease with participation for 
anonymous users. 
We now turn to data from Wikipedia contributors to analyze these questions.  
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III. Data and Methods 
We selected samples of Wikipedia contributors from the populations of both the 
French and Dutch language sites as of March 1, 2005.
2, 3  By March 2005 Wikipedia was 
well known, but significant debate over the quality of its content had not yet occurred 
(Encyclopedia Britannica 2006; Giles 2005). As of March 1 2005 there were a total of 
53,901 contributors to the French language site and 33,217 contributors to the Dutch 
language site.  The sampling procedure consisted of compiling a list of all contributors 
within each language group, then drawing two random draws within each language of up 
to 1,000 contributors for each user-type (registered and anonymous), for a total of 
n=7,058. (See Table 1.)  Since registered users are over-represented in our sample 
compared to their distribution among all contributors, we weight the analyses based on 
the population proportions of each user-type within each language group.     
 
Variables 
We hypothesize that contributor motivations effect the quality of their 
contributions.  That is, we are not measuring the quality of Wikipedia content per se, but 
rather the quality of Wikipedia contributors.  We measure the quality of contributions 
quantitatively as the rate of each contributor’s content retained in the current version of 
the topic article. Retention is only one quantitative dimension of the quality of a 
contribution, and likely a conservative measure to the extent that contributors and editors 
are satisficing
 (Simon 1957) rather than maximizing with regard to content, that is,  
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adding to or editing an entry until it is ‘good enough’ rather than until it is in some sense 
“perfect” or “complete.” 
The dependent variable is the retention rate, R, of contributions, measured as the 
percent of characters retained per contribution by each contributor. More specifically, we 
measure the number of characters retained, C, in a given article, summed across all edits 
(contributions), j, for each contributor, i, divided by the sum of the total number of 
characters, T, in each topic article edited per contributor.  
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For each contributor, we use the Wikipedia differencing algorithm
4 to compare the 
differences among three documents: (1) edit, the content submitted to each topic article 
by the contributor, (2) previous, the version of the article prior to the edit, and (3) current, 
the version of the article as it exists on the day the sample was drawn.  Edits generally 
occur in time prior to the time point at which current is measured, so current does not in 
general equal edit, though it is possible if the contributor contributed all of the current 
content.  We measure the retention of an edit by calculating the number of characters 
from a contributor’s edit (comparing edit to previous) that are retained in the current 
version (comparing edit to current) as a percentage of the total number of characters in 
the article.  For example, compare the following illustrative sentences, previous: “Public 
goods are unlike private goods;” edit: “Public goods, in contrast to private goods, are 
non-excludable;” and current: “In contrast to private goods, public goods are non-
excludable and non-rival.” Comparing edit to current, we find that (when considering  
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longest common subsequences) 62 of the total 75 characters in the current version are 
retained for a retention rate of 83% (note that spaces are counted in the character count).   
As illustrated in this example, a contributor’s edit may include any of the 
following: added material, edited or deleted content, as well as content kept from the 
previous version.  That means that our measure of retention includes all characters in the 
version ‘submitted’ by the contributor, no matter how much or how little of the content 
was added, deleted or changed by the contributor.  The reasoning for this is that a 
contributor has the opportunity to add, edit or delete whatever she chooses, so preserving 
content from earlier versions is taken to mean at least tacit acceptance of its quality.  It is 
important to note that Wikipedia requires that contributors edit on the granularity of 
whole entries.  For example, the data structure does not permit "journaling" in which a 
contributor might submit an edit such as: "like before, except change sentence 23 as 
follows."  The number of characters added, retained and total are pooled across all edits 
made by each contributor.  Overall, the mean retention rate at Wikipedia is 72%.  (See 
Table 2.) 
We recognize that retention rate does not take into account all important features 
of content quality in Wikipedia, including, for example, “edit wars”, in which two or 
more contributors continually change the content of a topic-entry, sometimes merely 
using the wiki to return the article to a previous version of the text.  Other important 
factors that we cannot address are the amount of time lapsed between edits, or the status 
of the content, e.g., whether the topic being edited is “under construction” or in the 
parlance of Wikipedia, a “stub” in which only a very brief entry on the topic exists.  
These issues are most important when evaluating the quality of content itself, i.e., the  
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coverage of specific topic areas in which the history of the ‘page’ is important.  In this 
study, however, we are interested in evaluating the quality of contributors, so we analyze 
their retention rates. 
The key independent variables are whether a contributor is registered or 
anonymous and their number of contributions.  Contributor registration status is 
measured by whether they have a registered user name or not.  Number of contributions 
is measured as the number of times a contributor made an edit.  On average, contributors 
made over 9 edits, with a range of 1-50 edits.  Given the significant positive skew of this 
measure, we take the natural log in the analyses.  Finally, our analyses also control for 
language area (French = 1, Dutch = 0), the total size of each article, measured as the total 
number of characters (natural log), and the size of the contribution, measured as the 
number of characters added per edit (natural log).  Contribution size controls for the 
likelihood that the smaller the contribution the more likely it is to be a minor change and 
thus more likely to be retained.  Article size controls for the possibility that registered and 
anonymous users contribute to fundamentally different types of Wikipedia topics. Since 
Wikipedia content is constantly evolving, at any given time there are many “new topics” 
with relatively small existing entries, as well as many well-established topics with a great 
deal of existing content.  It may be that anonymous users are more likely to contribute 
only to well-established articles, or conversely only to newer topics with less existing 
content. 
 
IV. Results  
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Table 3 shows the bivariate results for each variable by user type.  Anonymous 
and registered users differ in important ways.  Overall, registered users contribute more 
content across a greater number of edits compared to anonymous users, consistent with 
Hypotheses 1a and 2a.  Surprisingly however, anonymous users contribute higher quality 
content overall compared to registered users.  Given the expected motivations of 
reputation and identity among registered users, i.e., the zealots and committed experts, 
this is remarkable.   
Table 4 shows the retention rates for contributors by the intersection of the two 
contributor motivations, reputation and commitment.  Both committed experts and Good 
Samaritans have high quality contributions, supporting hypotheses 1b and 2b. Committed 
experts’ (cell 1) contributions are of significantly higher quality compared to registered 
users with fewer contributions (cell 2).  They are also significantly higher than 
anonymous users with similar numbers of contributions.  
TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
Good Samaritans (cell 4 in Table 4) make the highest quality contributions 
overall.  Good Samaritans contribute higher quality content than either registered users 
with similar levels of participation (cell 2), other anonymous users with more 
contributions (cell 3), and even registered users with many contributions (cell 1) though 
the latter is significant at the p<.10 level.   
The bivariate results shown in Table 4 also suggest support for hypotheses 1c and 
2c about the relationship between quality and contributions for different types of 
contributors.  Figure 1 displays the estimated regression lines for the quality of 
contributions (retention rate) regressed on commitment (log number of contributions) for  
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both registered and anonymous users.  Figure 1 shows that indeed quality changes with 
the extent of participation but in exactly the opposite direction for registered versus 
anonymous users.  Anonymous users’ quality is highest at low levels of commitment, and 
decreases as participation increases, while the opposite is true for registered users for 
whom quality increases with participation.     
TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE 
We now turn to the multivariate analysis.  Table 5 shows the results of 
multivariate regressions of the quality of contributions on levels of participation, 
controlling for article size, size of contribution and language, for registered and 
anonymous users.  Hypotheses 1b and 2b are both supported in Table 5.  Whereas log 
edits is positive for registered users, indicating increasing quality with increasing 
participation, it is negative for anonymous users.   
It is important to note that the control variables are also significant in explaining 
the quality of contributions.  The shorter a contribution is the higher its quality, for both 
registered and anonymous users. Quality is also higher when the topic article being edited 
is larger, regardless of the type of contributor. It may be that the larger a topic articles is, 
the more complete the information already included, so only those certain of their 
knowledge (i.e., experts, whether registered or anonymous) contribute to such articles.  In 
addition, French contributors in general are less likely to have their contributions retained 
compared to Dutch contributors.  We do not speculate as to why this may be the case. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Another way to look at the relationship between quality and quantity for different 
types of contributors is to examine the effects among those with few contributions  
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compared to those with many.  Table 6 shows the results of quality regressed on the type 
of user, controlling for the amount contributed, article size and language among those 
with fewer than five edits, and those with five or more edits. Consistent with the findings 
presented above, among those with fewer than five edits, registered users, compared to 
anonymous users (the omitted category), have significantly lower quality, but for those 
with five or more edits, registered users have higher quality.   
 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
Why should we care about understanding the quality of Wikipedia contributions?  
One reason is that Wikipedia is becoming a “source of record” increasingly cited by 
mainstream print and news media (Lih 2004).  For example, a search for Wikipedia in the 
top world newspapers in Lexis/Nexis for the period January 1-May 25, 2007 yielded 300 
articles. (See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedia_in_media.)  In part 
because of its exposure in mass media, readers of the Wikipedia.org website also are 
increasing dramatically.  According to a website that tracks the traffic (number of 
visitors) to websites, www.alexa.com, the Wikipedia website ranks 10
th in the Global Top 
500 websites (accessed May 2007).  As of October 2005 Wikipedia ranked as the top 
reference site (www.alexa.com).   
While contributors to Wikipedia vary in their interests in reputation and their 
commitment to the group, readers’ main interest is simply the quality of the content, i.e., 
whether the material is accurate and reliable.  Wikipedia readers, however, are highly 
uncertain about the quality of its content because they cannot rely on editors or publishers 
to screen for quality as they can when using a brand name encyclopedia.  Readers’  
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uncertainty may lead them to look at types of contributors for different signals of quality, 
such as registration or high levels of participation.  A registered user name provides 
access to the history of contributions for that contributor (i.e., reputation), and as such, 
readers may look to a contributor’s history, or even take registration itself, as a signal of 
quality.  Alternatively, readers may consider that a strong identity in Wikipedia is 
necessary for quality content, and so expect that only those with many contributions (i.e., 
Wikipedians, whether registered or not) will contribute high quality content.  To the 
extent that readers look for the intersection of registration and high participation, our 
analysis suggests they will indeed find high quality content from the committed expert 
contributors.  Either signal alone, however, suggests they will not find high quality 
material.  Further, attention to these signals alone may hinder readers from recognizing 
the high quality contributions of Good Samaritans who contribute one-time only and 
anonymously. 
A more important reason to care about the quality of Wikipedia is because it 
serves as an apparently successful example of a new form of production: open-source 
production (Kogut and Meitiu 2001; von Hippel 2002).  Open source production 
essentially involves creating a public good, and therefore entails the same social dilemma 
that confronts the production and maintenance of other public goods.  The intersection of 
two well-known mechanisms for overcoming social dilemmas, reputation and group 
identity, account for some of the variation in the quality of contributions to the open 
source encyclopedia, Wikipedia.  Consistent with the expectations of the open source 
community and with previous studies of open source goods, we find that zealots and 
highly committed experts contribute high quality content.  Yet, these mechanisms fail to  
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account for the very high quality content provided by anonymous Good Samaritans who 
do not care about reputation, and contribute only a few times.    
The findings of lower quality for anonymous contributors with high participation 
indicate a strong but negative interest in the collective good which, if left unchecked, 
could destroy the open source good much as other commons can be destroyed by similar 
collective action problems.  To deal with the negative impact of this group of contributors 
Wikipedia has instituted a policy that requires contributors to register after some number 
of anonymous contributions.  Of course a policy of required registration is somewhat 
contrary to the ideal of open source and open access, and could potentially inhibit Good 
Samaritans.  Since the majority of anonymous contributors make only one, high quality 
edit, such a policy may not be very problematic. 
Our finding that anonymous Good Samaritans contribute high quality content to 
open source goods is both novel and unexpected.  One reason the role of Good 
Samaritans may have been overlooked in other studies of collective goods is because we 
rarely have data for all contributions, large and small, over the entire production history 
of public goods.  For example, studies of participation in social movements focus on the 
role of individual incentives, social networks and collective resources (e.g., 
McAdam1982, 1988; Opp et al 1995) that facilitate the contributions of highly committed 
participants.  Alternatively, laboratory studies of collective goods necessarily create 
highly structured contexts that do not allow participation from actors outside of the study, 
such as potential Good Samaritan contributors who happen to pass by.  However, it also 
may be because of the scope of open source production, which enables vast numbers of  
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contributors to participate, that Good Samaritan contributors can play such an important 
role in producing collective goods.   
Sociologists have argued that social actors vary in both resources and levels of 
motivation to contribute to collective goods, so a critical mass of heterogeneous 
contributors is necessary to produce them (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Heckathorn 1992).  
While recognizing that production functions vary across types of collective goods 
(Marwell and Oliver 1993; Heckathorn 1992, 1996), open source production reduces the 
costs of contributing and expands the population of potential contributors so much that a 
critical mass is more likely to be reached early in the production process, and to be 
maintained throughout the ongoing production of open-source goods.  In other words, 
open source production alters the quantity of producers, which in turn affects the quality 
of the production process itself.  Our findings that one-time, anonymous Good 
Samaritans, as well as committed experts, contribute high quality content to Wikipedia 
suggest that open source production enables the exploitation of untapped productive 
resources that overcome barriers to efficient production of collective goods. 
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Notes 
1. Clean air, bridges and ocean habitats are all examples of public goods.  Economists 
define public goods, in contrast to private goods, as a type of good that is non-excludable 
and non-rival, and often also requires joint production.  Non-excludable means that once 
the good is produced it is available to all, though ‘all’ may be restricted by geography 
(e.g., you have to be in the White Mountains to breathe the clean air) or other 
characteristics, such as citizenship. A non-rival good is one in which consumption of the 
good does not reduce its availability.  Finally, many public goods must be collectively 
(jointly) produced either because the vastness of the resources required prevent one 
individual from producing it, or because the good itself requires the contributions of 
many actors (e.g., a group discussion). Public goods often are under-produced because 
individual and collective interests do not align9, 20 - 21 and because they lack a critical 
mass of potential contributors17.   
2. Data are available on request from the authors, on the condition that it not be shared 
subsequently or used for commercial purposes (please send requests via email to: 
wikidatarequest@dartmouth.edu). 
3.  The nature of the sampling procedure inhibited us from extracting data from the 
significantly larger English-language Wikipedia.  It is possible that our findings apply 
only to the French and Dutch language content, because of cultural differences or other 
unknown reasons.  Future research on other language areas is necessary to verify the 
findings we report here. 
4. Wikipedia uses a PHP port of Perl's Algorithm::Diff module 1.06, which uses the 
Longest Common Subsequence approach to computing string differences.  PHP is an  
  21 
open-source programming language used for developing applications, dynamic web 
content, and software.  
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Table 1. Population and Sample of Wikipedia Contributors by User Type and Language 
 
User Type   
Language  Registered  Anonymous 
 
Total 
 
French 
 
Population 
 
Sample 
 
 
 
5,690 
 
1,763 
 
 
 
48,211 
 
1,729 
 
 
 
53,901 
 
3,492 
 
Dutch 
 
Population 
 
Sample 
 
 
 
2,895 
 
1,819 
 
 
 
30,322 
 
1,747 
 
 
 
33,217 
 
3,566 
 
Total 
 
Population 
 
Sample 
 
 
 
8,585 
 
3,582 
 
 
 
78,533 
 
3,476 
 
 
 
87,118 
 
7,058 
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Table 2. Means for Wikipedia Contributor Characteristics (unweighted) 
 
  Total  French  Dutch 
 
Number of Cases 
 
7,058 
 
3,566 
 
3,492 
 
Retention Rate 
 
72.1 
 
(29.0) 
 
70.4 
 
(29.6) 
 
73.7 
 
(28.4) 
 
Number of Edits 
 
Log Edits 
 
9.4 
 
1.3 
 
 (15.0)  
 
(1.3) 
 
9.0 
 
1.2 
 
(14.5)  
 
(1.3) 
 
9.7 
 
1.2 
 
(15.5)  
 
(1.4) 
 
Article Size 
 
Log Article Size 
 
4,412   
 
7.8   
 
(5,886)  
 
(1.2) 
 
5,054 
 
7.9 
  
(6,869)  
 
(1.2) 
 
3,784   
 
7.7   
  
(4,647)  
 
(1.2) 
 
Contribution Size 
 
Log Contribution 
 
358 
 
4.8 
 
(1,545) 
 
(1.6) 
 
358 
 
5.7 
 
(1,089) 
 
(2.5) 
 
358 
 
5.7 
 
(1,889) 
 
(2.5) 
 
Registered User 
 
 
51% 
 
51% 
 
51% 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Wikipedia Contribution Characteristics by Type of User (unweighted) 
 
   
Registered User 
 
Anonymous User 
 
 
Quality 
 
70.3 
 
(28.4) 
 
74.0** 
 
(29.5) 
 
F = 29.7** 
df = 1,  7,056 
 
 
Log Edits 
 
1.9** 
 
(1.4) 
 
0.60 
 
(.83) 
 
F = 2,058.0** 
df = 1,  7,056 
 
Log Contribution size 
 
6.9** 
 
(2.3) 
 
4.5 
 
(2.1) 
 
F = 1,955** 
df = 1,  7,056 
 
Log Article Size 
 
7.8 
 
(1.1) 
 
7.8 
 
(1.3) 
 
F = 0.89 
df = 1,  7,056 
 
French language 
 
.49 
 
(.50) 
 
.50 
 
(.50) 
 
F = 0.19 
df = 1,  7,056 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
** p < .01   
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Table 4. Content Retention Rates by Contributor Motivations  
 
Interest in Reputation   
 
Level of Commitment 
Strong:  
Registered Users  
Weak: 
Anonymous Users  
 
Strong: 
5+ contributions 
 
1 
 
73% (.23) 
1,2  
n=1,941 
3 
 
69%  (.26)   
n=469 
 
Weak: 
1-4 contributions 
 
2 
  
67% (.36)   
n=1,641 
4 
 
75% (.30) 
3,4,5  
n=3,007 
 
Note: standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
1 cell 1 > cell 2 ANOVA F = 47.8, p<.001 
2 cell 1 > cell 3 ANOVA F = 11.3, p<.001 
3 cell 4 > cell 3 ANOVA F = 14.4, p<.001 
4 cell 4 > cell 2 ANOVA F = 70.1, p<.001 
5 cell 4 > cell 1 ANOVA F = 3.59, p<.10  
  30 
 
Table 5. OLS Unstandardized Coefficients of Quality of Contributions for Registered 
versus Anonymous Users (weighted) 
 
   
Registered Users 
 
 
Anonymous Users 
 
 
Constant 
 
.39** 
 
(.04) 
 
.54** 
 
(.04) 
 
Log Article Size 
 
.06** 
 
(.005) 
 
.05** 
 
(.004) 
 
Log Contribution 
Size 
 
-.03**             
 
(.003) 
 
-.03** 
 
(.003) 
 
French Language 
 
-.03** 
 
(.01) 
 
-.05** 
 
(.01) 
 
Log Edits 
 
.02** 
 
(.003) 
 
-.01+ 
 
(.006) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
Unweighted N 
 
.07 
3,582 
 
 
.08 
3,476 
 
+ p < .10    * p < .05      ** p < .01     
 
Note:  Standard Error terms in parentheses. 
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 Figure 1. Quality of Wikipedia Contributions by Number of Contributions for Registered 
and Anonymous Users. 
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Table 6. OLS Unstandardized Coefficients of Quality of Contributions by Level of 
Contribution (weighted) 
 
   
Few Contributions 
< 5 edits 
 
Many Contributions 
> 5 edits 
 
 
Constant 
 
.54** 
 
(.03) 
 
.39** 
 
(.05) 
 
Log Article Size 
 
.05** 
 
(.003) 
 
.06** 
 
(.01) 
 
Log Contribution Size 
 
-.03** 
 
(.002) 
 
-.03** 
 
(.004) 
 
French Language 
 
-.06** 
 
(.01) 
 
-.014 
 
(.01) 
 
Registered User 
 
-.05** 
 
(.02) 
 
.05** 
 
(.01) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
Unweighted N 
 
 
.08 
 
4,647 
 
.06 
 
2,410 
 
** p < .01  Note:  Standard Error terms in parentheses. 
 
 